


KING

Knowledge for Integration Governance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

by D. Carrillo, M. D'Odorico, G. Gilardoni

November 2014



About the project

KING project – Knowledge for INtegration Governance – presents a **snapshot of integration** paths and their governance in Europe, **providing evidence** and taking the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) as a main reference¹.

Financed by the European Commission under the scope of the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals 2007-2013 - Community actions 2012-2013, the project's objective was to provide, through a multidisciplinary approach, decision- and policy-makers with evidence-based recommendations on the design of migrant integration-related policies. It also provides guidance on how this should be articulated between different policy-making levels of governance.

Seven different disciplines were involved in the analysis to ensure its comprehensiveness namely, demography, economics, political science, social science, applied social studies, public administration and European policy.

The Common Basic Principles on Integration were taken as the framework on which the research was based. Given that CBPs are both analytical and prescriptive, the project uses these two approaches combining them. The first approach was analytical in nature, and describes the three basic dimensions of the process of integration: the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension, the cultural-religious dimension. The second approach was prescriptive in nature, to provide guidance on the design of integration policies and comprised of three strategies - mainstreaming, monitoring, non-discrimination.

In the KING research, the mentioned dimensions were analysed following the heuristic model proposed by Penninx and taking into account migrants' and the receiving societies' role and position on institutional, collective and individual levels.

An implementation of the CBPs related to the three dimensions is proposed here providing policy recommendations supported by evidence.

¹ The KING project started in September 2013 and will last until March 2015.

© 2014 Fondazione ISMU - Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the permission, in writing, from Fondazione ISMU – Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità. Licenced to the European Union under conditions.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

The importance of the Common Basic Principles on integration

The Common Basic Principles hastened a great debate on integration-related issues in Europe. They also encouraged the adoption of increasingly coherent strategies among Member States through sharing goals and tools. At the time of their adoption in 2004, they represented an extremely ambitious framework, clearly defining States' duties in ensuring integration of migrants and affirming that integration is a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation", which entrusts the responsibility to "accommodate each other" on both natives and migrants.

The EIF 2007-2013 has financed countless integration projects conceived and implemented in line with the CBPs framework, in particular for enhancing migrants' active citizenship (CBP 9) and economic participation (CBP 3), social cohesion (CBP 1, 2, 7) education and cultural policies (CBP 4, 5 8), non-discrimination and equality measures (CBP 2, 6) and evaluation and knowledge-sharing tools (CBP11). The financial resources provided to ensure the concrete application and implementation of the CBPs is pivotal. In this regard, the AMIF 2014-2020, commitment to financing integration practice guided by CBPs, is of the utmost importance for the years to come.

Today, ten years after their adoption, the CBPs' are still ongoing. The numerous policies and practices implemented in line with the CBPs and the reiterated and fundamental references to them have not exhausted their potential: they continue to guide the EU and Member States' action.

The JHA Council, in its Conclusions of 5-6 June 2014, reaffirmed its strong commitment to the Common Basic Principles and its intention to implement them further. It is thus of the upmost relevance to continue to explore and deepen their application and implementation at every level of governance, with a few caveats.

Despite the CBPs' role in highlighting the importance of involving both migrants and receiving societies into the process of integration, research consistently finds that this goal has still not been achieved. Indeed, there is a general strong emphasis on requiring migrants to adapt

whereas little is asked of members of receiving societies. Consequently, it is crucial to reflect on the disjuncture between migrants and natives in terms of resources, opportunities, rights and duties.

The KING project has analyzed the integration dimensions and strategies in light of the CBPs. In fact, each CBP has been included into a dimension or analyzed as a strategy. However, non-discrimination has been presented, more than others, as a crosscutting strategy. Non-discrimination cannot be referred to any single CBP as it relates to every domain of the integration process and refers both to migrants and receiving society.

What is integration?

Many studies have focused on integration and much knowledge has developed around this area. In general, there is little acknowledgement in the political discourses as well as in the main policy documents that integration is **a process** and an ongoing negotiation between cultures, that can either move forward when the right conditions are provided, or may not proceed if conditions are weak, or else can be reversed if conditions or opportunities deteriorate (J. Phillimore, 2014).

One of the most neglected aspects concerns **what migrants think about integration**. Despite the widespread fear that migrants bring with them dangerous and patriarchal values, evidence shows that migrants seek to be accepted by receiving societies and to play a meaningful role in the social and economic development of the country of destination (J. Phillimore, 2014).

The 29 migrants interviewed through field research carried out in Great Britain, in the context of the KING project, on the meaning of integration talk about the need to be accepted and the desire to contribute to the receiving society. Integration for migrants is seen as desirable, and a key goal. Adaptation is accepted and sought, in particular concerning language and institutional culture, but also living conditions enabling migrants to succeed. Mixing with a wide range of people is desired although rarely achieved beyond contacts within diverse communities. Acceptance is associated with material security and contribution

to the receiving country, such as being able to access the labour market.

When asked about the kind of support they needed to aid their integration, migrants responded: opportunities to learn and practice the receiving country's language; more information about everyday life – particularly regarding systems, rules and regulations governing migration and settlement; opportunities and places to meet native people and get to know them; support to access employment suited to professional qualifications; recognition of skills and training; opportunities information about ways of life and culture in the receiving society; training and help to become self-employed; clear permission to work, so that employers feel confident about hiring migrants; volunteering opportunities; help to be independent – support organizations to help migrants solve problems for themselves rather than resolving problems for them.

In the words of a spousal migrant (male) from Nigeria:

“First is always difficult for a new person to get integrated. But as time goes by I get to know more people, the language and it is getting easier. I am getting to where I am supposed to be. I am getting integrated.”

Upon arrival migrants experience isolation and loneliness. Most respondents' networks are very small at the beginning of their life in the receiving country: perhaps they consist of a single person or, in the case of refugees, they are often alone. Migrants frequently report being isolated and feeling afraid. Their insertion within the receiving society's context should be facilitated through a closer interaction between them and the receiving society:

“To me integration means I am accepted here and able to play a big role in the development of this country”.

“Yes, integration to me is good because I am now here and mix with many people, contribute to this society, even with my little knowledge. Yes, I am being accepted here”.

“I am able to participate in the society and contribute by working, paying tax, insurance and

everything I need to do. Integration is also the way I am accepted in the society as a person”.

Integration governance at a glance

The governance of integration represents a challenge. The main distinctive elements of integration governance in Europe involve different actors across different policy areas at local, national and supranational levels. Responsibilities are divided between the different administrative levels with areas of coordination.

Integration is a **competence** of individual Member States. However, at supranational level the EU plays an important role by offering a coherent framework for guiding and supporting Member States' implementation of their policies (J. Handoll, 2012). During the last 15 years, in spite of the limited mandate assigned to the EU by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU art. 79) regarding integration, the EU has developed binding rules which have directly or indirectly addressed integration. In particular, since 2003 eight Directives on legal migration have been adopted. They define the conditions for admission and the rights of different categories of TCNs. They include: the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC; the Long Term Residents' Directive 2003/109/EC; the Students' Directive 2004/114/EC; the Scientists' Directive 2005/71/EC; the Blue Card Directive 2009/109/EC on highly qualified workers; the Single Permit Directive of 2011/98/EU; the Seasonal Workers Directive 2014/36/EU; and the Intra-corporate Transferees Directive 2014/66/EU.

Therefore the EU intervenes in areas which are closely linked to integration through hard law instruments. For example, having access to the labor market, benefiting from equal treatment or being able to receive health care are all elements which enhance, when they are accessible, the integration process of third country nationals in the receiving society. While the harmonization process in these cases is not direct, by including provisions related to these rights in its legislation, the EU creates the conditions for corresponding national rules and policies.

At the national level, the governance frame is made even more complex by the existence of multiple institutions. There is a range of

possibilities regarding, for instance, the existence of dedicated integration ministries or departments within other ministries dealing with integration-related issues.

Some studies have analysed the manifold ways in which Member States, at different times, have attempted to tackle the complex issue of integration, creating ***ad hoc* institutions** or embedding **new agencies in ministries**. Outcomes concern *i)* countries characterised by perpetual change, for example, The Netherlands; *ii)* countries where migration and integration have been explicitly reflected in the titles of ministries, as in France, Ireland, Italy and Denmark and *iii)* countries where ministries have been set up or renamed with titles like immigration, integration, equality, non-discrimination, cooperation, asylum or even identity. In these cases, in addition to the aim of effective integration, politicians wanted to send a message to the public about their governments' determination to act.

Elsewhere, for example in Sweden, Luxembourg, Britain, Spain, Belgium and Austria, integration competences have been assigned to important ministries (State Secretaries). A positive aspect of such an arrangement is the inclusion of the matter into a strong and assertive ministry, instead of isolating it in a special ministry. Furthermore, personalizing this task by assigning it to a designated person demonstrates the relevance of migration and integration, and gives migrants a high-ranking contact person with whom they can relate and build up trust. If these attached ministers deputise the cabinet minister, this adds to their importance throughout government (D. Thränhardt, 2014).

In addition, depending on contextual characteristics, some Member States also benefit from the active participation of their **subnational levels** such as federal states, regions or cities. These can have voice in designing integration-related policies. Indeed, the role of local authorities in delivering integration services is a pivotal aspect of integration governance (M.V. Desiderio and A. Weiner, 2014).

Cities, in general, demonstrate the ability to design inventive manners to deal with top-down policies that rarely seem to understand the necessities coming from the ground. The strategy

adopted by cities is not to implement the national policies as a final objective, but to use them as a delineating framework that must be further modified, accommodated or renegotiated in the everyday governance practice with the other local stakeholders (P. Matusz Protasiewicz, 2014). This creative adaptability is important to enable national level policies to adhere to a general European framework on integration despite different immigration and political histories (G. Craig, 2014). However, the situation is much more complex at the local level.

Three models summarize the differences among cities' integration policies in Europe: *i)* the *interventionist model*, visible in Vienna or Bologna, which attempts to encompass all sectors of cultural, social, economic, religious integration; *ii)* the *regulatory model*, visible in Copenhagen or Turku, which is selective and based on the active intervention in the social and economic sectors of integration, but indifferent or neutral in the cultural, ethnic, and religious domains. However, we can argue that the absence of an integration policy is a policy as it is the result of a political choice. Therefore the third integration strategy is characterised as *iii)* the *passive model*, visible in Porto and Dublin, lacks proper infrastructure, and there is a general reluctance to invest in integration measures. It presumes that migrants already speak the local language, do not suffer language barriers and can thus integrate without any additional help (P. Matusz Protasiewicz, 2014). In these three models, the outcomes in terms of integration are different, as cities create their own frame of governance in which their role as mediator or negotiator among different players clearly emerges, opposite to what usually happens at other levels of governance.

The negotiation governed by municipalities should involve as many subjects as possible, in order to acquire a broad consensus.

Indeed, a policy/practice is more likely to be successful if *i)* migrants (i.e. end users) are placed at the centre of a policy/practice, so that it can better respond their needs; *ii)* the design encourages a dense network of interaction between the different actors involved (density); *iii)* the actors involved in the network belong to different policy-making levels and non-profit/civil

society (complexity)² (N. Pasini and P. Coletti, 2014).

Funding for integration projects is often contingent on demonstrable **short-term results, yet the outcomes of integration will often only be manifest over years** and can be hard to disentangle from the impact of other developments. Frequently projects are short-term, receiving only one to three years funding. This can mean that by the time projects are operational and evaluations can commence, the project must be wound up. Thus, the **risk of re-inventing the wheel** in integration initiatives is very high.

Many excellent projects cease to function because they reach the end of their funding cycle. All the learning, **capacity and knowledge that resulted from investment are at risk of being lost.**

- As a long-term process, integration requires more stable funding support with projects judged to be effective, given long-term funds. Strategies and projects need more time in order to better develop their activities, improve capacity building, reduce waste of knowledge, and obtain more evidence-based and (measurable) results.

The Integration Dimensions

The three integration dimensions, legal-political, socio-economic and cultural-religious provide a valuable framework for **understanding the integration process** and, therefore, for providing guidance on how to better manage this complex phenomenon.

The Legal-Political Dimension

The *legal-political dimension* refers to **residence, political rights and statuses**. Therefore, it refers to **CBP 9**, which states that “*the participation of migrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures,*

especially at the local level, support their integration”. There are several forms of migrant participation in the democratic process, such as voting, activism in a political party, participation in consultative bodies. However, it is worth emphasizing that any form of stakeholders’ involvement in policy-making and support to migrant networks is helpful in the formulating of integration policies and measures.

Indeed, **voting rights** and the right to stand as a candidate are the pillars for ensuring that migrants can express their views on how society should be developed (European Modules on Integration, 2014). Pivotal, direct political inclusion of migrant groups and ethnic minorities takes place through access to voting rights. When voting rights are granted migrants will represent a potentially relevant political constituency for consideration by the main political organizations.

However, granting the right to vote and to stand for elections does not mean that political participation will necessarily follow. Political mobilization requires a series of competences and networks that are profoundly shaped by the surrounding political and social context. The local level is crucial in this respect. Many research projects highlight initiatives undertaken at the city level to foster migrants’ political participation and to turn a formal right into a concrete capacity.

Dublin and Dortmund are examples of top-down initiatives promoted by the local governments which seek to directly address individual migrants by providing training courses in voting education and information sessions on local politics specifically directed to residents with an migrant background (City of Migration and Maytree Foundation, 2012).

These kinds of activities are useful to show migrants the value of political participation in their new home country, by providing information about the functioning of the political system and the types of parties, as well as on the potential

² In addition, the three features, if combined, guarantee that the output addresses its initial target and that the outcome favours integration. All this leads to the activation of social mechanism, such as reciprocity, control, acceptance, certification of actors’ claims by public authorities, material and non-material rewards, and positive effect of past

experience, that can trigger the two-way process between migrants and the receiving society stated by CBP 1 (N. Pasini and P. Coletti, 2014).

impacts of political participation (European Modules on Integration, 2014).

- The positive effects of allowing voting rights for third country nationals should be further explored by Member States at national and local levels.
- The political participation of migrants with voting rights should be encouraged by providing information on local politics and on voting systems.

In the city of Turku, Finland, where voting rights are granted after two years of legal residence, the political participation of migrants has increased in a natural way, neither as a consequence of an active city policy to promote political participation, nor forced by a strong mobilization of migrants themselves, but rather as a consequence of an openness of the political system (at least for migrants who have established themselves successfully in Turku).

National legislation draws the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens and decides under which conditions the latter may become members of the national community through **citizenship's** acquisition processes.

Various legislative amendments and proposals in several EU member States make citizenship harder to obtain (see R. Bauböck *et al*, 2006, 2009). A general shift to more demanding integration conditions has taken place, resulting in the exclusion of large number of TCNs from obtaining citizenship, notably in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands (see T. Strik *et al.*, 2010).

However, while only rarely acknowledged and studied, the local dimension of citizenship policy may nevertheless represent a crucial policy-making arena in contemporary receiving countries. It is at the local level that criteria for membership in a certain community acquires social meaning.

- Access to citizenship should be regarded as an important integration tool and should therefore be facilitated at the national level. In particular, States should provide for more transparency and clarity in administrative procedures.

- Promote actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship at the local level (e.g. advice on citizenship procedures, naturalization campaigns).

While in Germany and Austria such responsibility is upon regional and provincial authorities, in the other Member States the national authority, through the local office, are still considering this. This is the case, for instance, in the Ministry of the Interior in Italy, where the prefectures (local branches of the Ministry of the Interior) have the task of collecting applications and checking the documents, and in the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Netherlands (which is an authority subordinate to the Ministry of Alien Affairs and Integration). However, in the Netherlands, the preliminary investigation and registration of applications is carried out by municipal authorities (R. Van Oers, B. De Hart & C.A. Groenendijk, 2006: 422–423).

The case of Switzerland (Helbling M., 2008 and 2010), is the best example of a local political citizenship arena in Europe. Final decisions on naturalization applications are taken at a municipal level by a political body, i.e. the local parliament, the executive, or even the entire population through direct ballot. Politicians are also involved in various stages of the procedure, even if it is generally the local administration that keeps in touch with the applicants, informs them about the formal aspects of the process, checks to see if the main criteria are fulfilled and makes a first assessment of the candidate's chances of obtaining a Swiss passport. Officials also deliver recommendations to the political bodies involved in the process (Helbling M., 2008: 13).

However, apart from the competence formally accorded to local authorities in naturalization procedures, **cities can play a much more fundamental role by promoting different kinds of actions** aimed at fostering access to citizenship. This could take the form of language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship tests or examinations.

The naturalization campaigns carried out in some German cities, such as Berlin or Hesse (I. Chopin 2006: 226) are a case in point. A more

comprehensive project has been promoted by the municipality of Hamburg, where volunteer facilitators from various different communities have been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who are hesitant or need guidance because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge on the benefits of naturalization (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation, 2012).

CBP 9 even stresses that, in order to support migrant integration, the *formulation, especially at local level, of integration policies and measures should include the participation of migrants.*

Enabling migrants' participation and public visibility leads to the activation of social mechanisms, such as reciprocity, control, acceptance, certification of actors' claims by public authorities, material and non-material rewards, thus triggering the two-way process between migrants and the receiving society (CBP 1).

The project Economic policy: ENGAGE - The Corporate Volunteers Mentors – Portugal- is an interesting best practice example. Starting by defining the needs of migrants in different areas (qualification and job search, entrepreneurship, health, citizenship and participation), it aims to create a network of corporate volunteers as mentors. Some meeting points for newcomers were created in order to promote personal, social and organizational enrichment, triggering the mechanism of acceptance which fosters links among the actors that are useful for changing their behaviors (R. Cialdini, 2010).

With specific reference to **migrants' participation** in consultative bodies and in local administrations, evidence shows that where the inclusion of migrants in formal and informal channels of political participation occurs, this may lead to (admittedly varied) forms of proactive policies in the socio-economic domain and often also in the cultural-religious domains. On the legal and political dimension of migrant integration, there are examples across Europe of **consultative committees** and migrant councils at local level, yet evidence of their concrete impact in policy-making is not definitive. Migrant consultative institutions may favor the actual participation of migrants, as a channel for individual participation, and group

representation. Alternatively they can be interpreted as a signal of their political marginalization (M. Martiniello, 2005).

In 2005 the city of Amsterdam reintroduced the Diversity Council stressing the need to establish a link and strengthen the dialogue between migrant associations and the city administration.

Since 1998 in Copenhagen, an Integration Council has been created to attend to the interests of ethnic minorities and act as their mouthpiece. It also guides politicians, standing committees and the administration of the city on how to secure an efficient and coherent integration policy.

Lisbon set up a consultative committee composed of appointed representatives of the larger ethnic minority associations. It was able to voice their views and interests on local policy.

Frankfurt established the Foreigners' Council (KAV) that included 37 members directly elected by TCNs. They participate in all the City Council committees.

Therefore, migrant participation could be promoted by:

- Creating opportunities to participate.
- Ensuring the participation and inclusion in policy decision-making processes of all (migrant) groups affected by a certain decision.
- Creating specialized migrant consultative bodies which have a concrete say in policy-making processes (rather than committees with solely symbolic functions).
- Institutionalizing the participation of migrant representation in local consultative bodies/councils.

Furthermore, other actions can indirectly foster participation, such as:

- Striving for more intercultural openness in all administrative levels, e.g. by increasing the proportion of employees with a migrant background.

- Distribution of information for encouraging migrants to be aware and to make use of their rights.
- Exchanging best practices and experience and following up policy implementation.

Migrant organisations may have an important role in providing pre-arrival assistance; initial reception in the form of translation, interpretation, and support; and assistance with building of skills and the provision of cultural knowledge (F. Challenor *et al.*, 2005; J. Phillimore *et al.*, 2009). Nonetheless the role, the power and the nature of associations vary greatly (T. Caponio, 2005; M. Caselli, 2010)

Indeed, it is possible to state that **membership** in any form of organisation could help increase political participation and integration. Other non-governmental actors, besides migrants, are key stakeholders and must be carefully identified and thoroughly involved in policy definition and implementation.

The CAI (Centro de Apoyo a la integración, ES) officials have established networks with the main communities and migrant organizations, and informal meeting are organized with them when the municipality is in the process of discussing the Pluri-annual Plan. It is possible for migrant associations to be involved as partners in carrying out specific activities, in particular festivals and / or public events.

In addition, political parties and movements deserve special attention. Nationalist-populist right-wing parties and movements with strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant positions have recently gained ground in many European countries (A. Martinelli, 2014). They can feed a vicious circle of increasing obstacles to integration, rising cultural and ethnic tensions and popular support for securitisation policies. In this respect:

- Policymakers should put migrants at the centre of the action, engaging as many levels of governance and as many stakeholders as possible.

- Support, on one hand, migrant networks, as they play a crucial role in fostering integration, and on the other hand, migrant organisations, however informal, as they contribute to both bridging and bonding activities.

The socio-economic dimension

The socio-economic dimension relates to access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident, irrespective of national citizenship. It concerns equal access and equal use of institutional facilities to access work, housing, education and health services.

The European directives clearly express the importance and consequently the need to ensure that third country nationals enjoy the same rights as home country nationals. Nevertheless, as stated above, there is a fundamental difference between formal entitlement to a right and the practice of exercising it.

Although the CBPs 3, 5 and 6 indicate what the goals should be in the domain of employment, education and access to services, **European countries are far from ensuring equal access and equal outcomes to migrants and natives**. There is still a significant gap between the two groups and, despite the numerous interesting initiatives realised across Europe, migrants demonstrably face more difficulties than natives in enjoying rights and accessing opportunities.

CBP 3 states that **employment is a key part of the integration process**, but while it represents the first step in the integration process, barriers and limits in accessing the labour market and transferring social benefits, strongly hamper this process.

Furthermore, the very first step for successful integration is undermined by the opportunities available in the labour market. Clearly, the labour market structure is stronger than any policy in determining migrants' integration into receiving societies. For migrants, economic outcomes rest on a combination of the economic structure of the destination country, its migration policy and, in varying degrees, the migration policy of the sending country. Moreover, the economic system, which is far from being integrated in Europe, is

embedded in multiple social structures which migrants need to negotiate. At the same time, as integration takes place in different dimensions, well-managed *integration* policies and long-sighted *migration* policies should be combined together, so as to mitigate some perverse effects linked to labour market structures.

The European experience illustrates how labour migration policies and selection of migrants lack long term planning and are disjointed from the real needs of the market.

One successful project operates in Amsterdam where The Platform Arbeidsmarkt en Onderwijs (PAO) brings together key stakeholders and produces a twice yearly labor market monitor which provides the local administration with up-to-date data concerning the labor status of Amsterdam citizens, including those with a migrant background (DIVE, 2013: 16).

Furthermore, available opportunities are not expressed clearly, contributing to brain wasting and limiting the correct skill matching.

In addition, this regime neglects those migrants such as refugees and family members, who cannot access the labour market through these channels.

- Governments should focus on the role of labour market access as a key to successful integration, rather than thinking about large-scale social engineering projects.
- Bilateral or multilateral frameworks should be put in place in order to match skills and gaps.
- Migrants would, where possible and appropriate, be selected on the basis of their skills, thereby reducing skill waste and facilitating their entry into employment.
- Priority checks (giving precedence to European citizens) could be eliminated.

Work is considered to be central to the **participation of migrants** as well as to the contribution they make to the receiving society. In other words, the correct incorporation of migrants into the labour market actively increases economic and societal growth. Nonetheless, the employment insecurity that currently concerns

the entire active population in “developed” economies has extremely negative impacts on migrant populations.

The German economy, for instance, shows a serious insider-outsider cleavage within the labour market. While insiders are still covered by collective agreements and enjoy a great degree of employment security, outsiders, who are not covered, have to accept more flexible and individual contracts, wage dispersion and unstable working conditions.

In the United Kingdom, as well as in many other European countries, migrants provided the buffer to meet increased demand in good times, and there was no collective bargaining in some sectors, where massive inflow of foreign-born labor could have been prevented.

- Legal access to temporary jobs or occasional employment could be facilitated by reducing legal and administrative barriers (e.g. through easier bureaucratic procedures for hiring people temporarily or occasionally, such as the Italian “voucher system”), subject to regulation of conditions.

On the whole, migrants are overrepresented in temporary **jobs** but the existing bureaucratic, legal and administrative barriers make it extremely difficult to secure portability of social benefits to the country of origin.

- Migrants who are legally employed should be able to accumulate social benefits (pension, healthcare, etc.) in temporary/occasional jobs.
- Systems should be developed to secure portability of social benefits to countries of origin.

Migrants are also overrepresented in the **informal market** with significant social and individual costs. These include forgone tax revenues on the receiving society’s side, and no possibility for claiming benefits on the side of new inhabitants.

Informality is also the consequence of an unequal access to the labour market. In France, for instance, labour market access and integration are complicated by existing barriers, which often

explicitly exclude non-citizens from a number of positions, such as civil servants, lawyers, doctors, dentists, midwives, surgeons, pharmacists, brokers, chartered accountants, bailiffs, notaries, and so forth.

In the Netherlands, the native-migrant gap remains, aggravated by limited language knowledge and, as a consequence, negative perceptions by natives.

- Information on European labour market opportunities and needs (skills shortages) and requirements (bureaucracy, procedures, etc.) should be channelled to potential migrants through a portal accessible from migrants' countries of origin.

Insufficient language skills and limited education represent obstacles to successful employment. Consequently, there are significant employment participation and earning gaps between natives and second-generation migrants due to low educational levels and insufficient vocational training devoted to the latter group.

Moreover, improving employability through **recognition of qualifications**, training courses, and offers of work experience, would have a positive impact the other dimensions of integration.

Excellent examples of targeted language courses and of vocational top-up training are offered by Swedish policies (especially concerning asylum seekers). In Sweden all migrants (aged 20 – 64 and also for persons between 18 and 19 who arrived without their parents) receive a personalised 'integration plan' and assistance to find a job and a house. Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) is a free language course, which includes mandatory job preparation such as internships, and work experience. The goal is to offer 40 hours of full-time activity per week for a maximum of 24 months.

CBP 5 states: "Effort in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society."

In this regard, the first objective to pursue should be the full inclusion of pupils with migrant

background in the **education system** ensuring equal access, equal use and equal outcomes, compared to native pupils. However, as noted above, institutional arrangements could represent an obstacle despite what is stated by the Long Term Residence directive provisions and Member States' affirmation of children's right to receive a correct education.

The institutional arrangements of the education system are entirely inadequate in many European countries as, not only migrants, but also more generally native disadvantaged people are affected by problems, preventing them from obtaining good and equal outcomes.

- Migrant children need additional support in order to ensure that they have equal access, equal use and equal outcomes in education. Such measures should also serve the needs of native children. Indeed, these improvements would, in turn, result in the increase of the number of migrant children and disadvantaged natives accessing tertiary education.

Many research projects illustrate the specific structural factors that may explain differences in (migrant) children's performance. These factors include features of the education system (such as ability tracking, age of selection, transitions between early, primary and secondary education, ethnic majority bias in textbooks and teaching practices); resources allocated; legal framework for enrolment (according to legal *status*, parental choice or residential catchment area); integration policies; and national discourses on migration and integration.

Furthermore, undocumented migrant children can face unexpected yet avoidable obstacles due to their migratory *status*. Even if national laws prohibit schools from asking for documentation from migrant children, many schools actually do so, in order to avoid having undocumented migrant children amongst pupils. In countries such as The Netherlands, Poland and Hungary, schools also justify identification document requests by arguing that funding is allocated according to the number of students enrolled. Finally, undocumented children tend to have no access to education before and after compulsory schooling.

- The set of rights laid down in EU directives requires proper implementation and monitoring, notably equity in treatment. Thus, States should remove all *legal* barriers (at the legislative level) and all *practical/administrative* barriers, to ensure effective access to education for migrant children.

Ensuring the principle of “Equality” means adopting strategies to close the gap between migrants and natives. One key point which facilitates integration in relation to education is:

- To improve training of teachers at all levels to ensure they are sensitive and equipped with the skills to work with a range of cultures and ethnic and national origins.

In Italy, migrant children with a poor command of the Italian language are often kept down one year in primary school, and even in the lower levels of secondary school. The impact of this appears to further disadvantage children throughout their schooling and employment and to compromise their possibilities for full integration (E. Mussino and S. Strozza 2012).

Nevertheless, **pre-school language tuition** can facilitate the placement of pupils in school.

In the Land of Hessen, Kindergärten (nurseries) German language courses were established: 15,000 children were offered an extra training in German language every year. For those children who did not succeed, a further year of intensive German teaching was offered. More than 1,000 teachers were teaching within this programme, and nearly all parents accepted it. The measures were effective: between 2002 and 2012 the percentage of children with a migrant background, who were not ready for school, decreased from 35.7% to 12.4%.

The education system should:

- Train teachers at all levels, to ensure that they are equipped with the special skills sets to needed to be sensitive to diversity and to deal with disadvantaged groups.
- Organize local school-based bridging programs and gap filling programs to help

students reach the standards they need to succeed alongside their peer group.

Furthermore, there are concerns about the relatively larger number of migrant children not in education, or employment or training schemes, although the research base in this area is relatively weak. More data are required particularly around the intersection between education, training and employment.

In Rotterdam, new types of school have been introduced to stem the high drop-out. A substantial amount of research (e.g. D. Gilborn and H. Mirza 2000) demonstrates the continuing impact on racism within the education system which, despite some contradictory trends within certain migrant groups, impedes educational attainment for minority and migrant young people. The appropriateness of education at the top end of secondary school is often questionable. This has led, in some countries, to an increased focus on vocational education opportunities.

Such evidence seems to contradict the recorded motivation and increasing educational attainment of migrant children and points to increasing segmentation between different groups. This differentiation is also apparent in established minorities where children (and particularly girls) of Indian and Chinese origin tend to do much better than most other minority children in terms of educational attainment.

In Oslo, Master’s students acted as diversity mentors in secondary schools. There was a 30 percent increase in university admissions from these schools; compared to an average 7 percent increase in Oslo schools more generally. A mentoring scheme for mature students from minority backgrounds helped to lower dropout from university. In 2012, there were 11 percent minority students with the target of 15 percent likely to be reached within the next two years. Encouragingly, Oslo University turned the project into a permanent diversity office (Intercultural Cities, 2013).

Segregation is one of the main factors for determining low results in school. In Germany, interethnic friendships between minorities and natives in particular neighbourhoods depends critically on the level of education of minorities

and is less likely in areas with greater degrees of ethnic segregation (Schlueter E., *et al.* 2013). There are many examples of local initiatives taken to reduce school segregation. Nevertheless, the analysis of available evidence shows that very few countries have translated local initiatives and *ad hoc* projects in this area into national policies.

Ideally, schools should affirm the role of appropriate parental support. In Spain, a study of migrant's parental aspirations for their children illustrated how these aspirations can be diluted in the context of generally modest expectations of both native and migrant young people. The study notes that if government and schools were to make effective use of migrant parental ambitions for their children, focussing particularly on parents who were amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged, it would not only help the integration of migrant children and address racial discrimination but raise educational attainment more generally (A. Portes *et al.* 2013).

Moreover, children's language attainment can be held back by a lack of linguistic continuity between school and home. A study has shown that when migrant women were more socially mobile, their children had better educational attainments. The more migrants are socially mobile, the greater their aspirations regarding their children's educational attainment, the more their children feel encouraged to study up to tertiary education levels.

- Build relationships between schools, the children's parents and the communities in which the school is situated.
- Stress the linguistic continuity between school and home by providing language courses for parents at school and within the workplace, involving trade unions.

These results clearly illustrate the strong links between the different dimensions of the integration process. The results also highlight how the integration process is inextricably intertwined with political choices and the opportunities they open.

CBP 6 states: *Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services*

is seen as *a critical foundation for better integration*. Indeed, feeling an accepted part of the society, and therefore becoming an effective member of society, strongly depends on the openness of institutions and welfare provisions. However, many countries are tightening their immigration policy, which limits immediate or longer-term access to welfare, in the context of debates about whether migrants are a drain on welfare provisions.

The issue has an important political relevance, and is enshrined into the anti-immigrant rhetoric. Research addressing this issue have shown that, compared to natives with the same socio-economic characteristics, migrants do not use more **welfare provision**. Obviously, the more migrants are excluded from a successful integration process, and therefore excluded from social mobility, the more they will rely on social provision.

The reference made by CBP 6 to *a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way* is often neglected, if not completely disregarded. In relation to integration and to access to different aspects of welfare provisions, in most countries (with some exceptions e.g. Sweden) access to welfare is highly conditional on immigration *status* (H. Bolderson, 2011; P. Dwyer *et al.* 2012).

In addition, there are countries where integration is not yet an important public issue, as in many East and Central European Countries such as Poland and Latvia, as well as other states such as Cyprus and Finland.

- Resources should be concentrated on areas where there are higher levels of needs regardless of immigration *status*, in order to reduce pressure on services, reduce tensions and encourage equal access for all.
- Access to services should be guaranteed, including the provision of customised solutions to reach the most excluded parts of the migrant population.

The **health service**, which often represents the first contact point between migrants and institutions, experiences a wide range of problems. These include: migrants' lack of understanding of the health system functioning; language barriers; poor interpretation/translation and over-reliance on

family members for interpretation; lack of awareness about health prevention and inoculation systems; bureaucratic barriers to registering for healthcare; high levels of poverty restricting access to fresh or healthy foods; overcrowding and exploitation in housing or employment leading to increased propensity to communicable diseases; poor access to antenatal care associated with higher infant and maternal mortality; lack of trust in health services or fear of being charged; exclusion from health services for undocumented migrants in some countries (e.g. Sweden); charging for services in others (e.g. UK); racism and discrimination by individual professionals; and institutional racism and pathologizing of ethnicity (G. Craig, 2014).

The difficulty migrants have in accessing care are generally thus caused by confusion about the system and the failure of healthcare providers to be effective in explaining how health systems are structured and what people's entitlements are (B. Migge and M. Gilmartin, 2011; J. Phillimore, 2011).

- Given many budget cuts and constraints in the national funding of healthcare, governments should partner with civil society organisations to help support appropriate provision within communities.

A study of migrants' experience of healthcare in Ireland suggested that migrants' perceived that the system was poorly adapting to the needs of a rapidly diversifying population and that, where possible (e.g. for economic migrants), they would prefer either to access healthcare in their own countries or at least to confirm diagnoses and medical advice with medical practitioners in their own country.

- Doctors and healthcare personnel should be equipped with the skill sets needed to deal with the different needs of a highly diversified population. Cultural mediators should work alongside healthcare personnel in hospitals, clinics and health centres.

Furthermore, the lack of appropriate **monitoring of outcomes** means that in most countries it is not possible to explore health outcomes by migration status, while in others naturalised migrants become invisible in the data. Alternatively, health outcomes data are based on ethnicity or even a basic minority/majority binary with scant

consideration of other demographic characteristics that may have more extensive impacts upon migrant/minority health (i.e. age and gender).

- States should be more aware of migrants' problems in accessing health services and should develop a better monitoring system, taking into account variables such as age, gender, immigration status and ethnicity.

The cultural and religious dimension

The *cultural and religious* dimension concerns **perceptions and practices of migrants and of the receiving society and their reciprocal reaction to differences and diversity**. This dimension is ambiguous and more difficult to capture precisely because identities and perceptions change over time, as do stereotypes and consequent discrimination, depending on historical and broader political changes.

The analysis of the cultural and religious dimension is particularly important for the future development of integration policy for the following reasons:

- Identity is a key aspect for policy development. However, the use made of identity in public policies could be dangerous if tensions between "chosen identities" and "attributed identities" grow;
- Culture and religion have a large impact on public opinion, which is crucial for accepting or rejecting different policies;
- Immigration is perceived by citizens of EU countries as more of a cultural problem than an economic one (M. Poletti and M. Regalia, 2014).

CBP 2 – states that *integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union* – pointing to the respect of fundamental rights enshrined in the **Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU** as human dignity, liberty and security, and non-discrimination. In this regard, migrants should understand, respect, and benefit from common European and national values (COM (2005)389final), while receiving societies should fully apply those rights.

- The basic values of the European Union mentioned in CBP 2 should be clearly

related to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

As notes above, the link between values and rights is of the utmost importance. On one hand, respect of the basic values of the European Union is a pre-requirement for acceptance of migrants by receiving societies and it should be supported by exploring effective ways to raise public adhesion to those values. On the other hand the respect of migrants' rights is to be observed primarily because it pertains to European values. Moreover, it increases the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and thus, their potential to contribute to the growth of receiving countries (M.D. Kervin, 2013: 7).

- National and local institutions in receiving countries should respect rights as defined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
- Countries who do not provide specific protection for children of undocumented migrant and/or do not accept these children in the health system should observe the requirements of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, which all EU MS have signed up to.

CBP 4 states that the *Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration*. The word 'indispensable' has been interpreted as necessary or compulsory. Provision of **language training** at local level is an absolute necessity regardless of locality. Access to work and services significantly improves if knowledge of the language improves. Preeminently under the EIF (2007-2013), **introductory courses** and language tuition have been put in place. Compared to compulsory courses, the National Integration Plan adopted since 2009 in Luxembourg has shown successful voluntary agreement.

A project to improve integration that played a lead role was OLAI (Luxembourg Reception and Integration Office). The role of OLAI was to coordinate and implement a national integration strategy. The plan involved four key factors (Ministry of Family and Integration, 2009), firstly, guidance for newcomers; secondly, assistance in social, economic, political and cultural integration;

thirdly, to fight discrimination; and finally, to study migration. One key element of the integration plan was the Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI). The CAI is a two-year agreement aimed at any foreigner over the age of 16 year's old living legally in Luxembourg. The agreement is also seen as holding symbolic value as it is not obligatory. It has therefore been seen as indicative of an individual's willingness to commit to integration and settlement in Luxembourg.

Despite the many successful experiences carried out all around Europe, the provision of language teaching is still variable in its quality and with regard to the conditions required for accessing courses. Civil society organizations are limited and they often provide language training which can result in oversubscribed and basic level language programs.

- Good quality language training is to be better guaranteed.

In places like the Netherlands and the UK migrants have to pay to attend language courses. This becomes problematic when basic language knowledge requirements are a condition to access rights.

A particular innovative approach has been developed through the Mercator Special Instruction Project in Germany. Mercator approached universities to ask if they would train their students to teach German as a second language. Through a series of negotiations with schools and universities, and with improved grades and positive testimonies from participants to evidence its success, the teacher training model and curriculum has now officially been instituted throughout North Rhine-Westphalia by the state government. A change of law in 2008 now requires every university to implement the program (V. Ramalingham, 2013, 57).

The part of CBP 4 stating that *enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration* is particularly important. Italy introduced the "**Integration Agreement**", a sort of contract that migrants have to sign when they obtain their permit of staying in Italy. The agreement includes language command requirements (A2 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) and a

requirement of the basic knowledge of laws and institutions. However, the language tuition system, as it is, does not allow the achievement of the established target. Evidence shows that language tuition courses are attended more by those who wish to learn Italian to improve personal knowledge or to have a better employment position, rather than by those who are supposed to sign the integration agreement.

- With regards to integration agreements, institutions should provide a proper enabling system, grounded on reality. Otherwise, integration requirements may lead to social exclusion rather than to an enhancement of integration.
- Language courses should be provided at no cost, reflecting migrants varying needs of integration.
- While language courses for new arrivals have proven to be successful, introductory courses should be provided after the first settlement.

On arrival in the country of migration new migrants rely heavily upon friends, family and religious networks with almost no intervention from the State.

- Introductory programs including civic and cultural orientation courses should be proposed considering actual needs of newly arrived migrants.

Compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands, are an example of civic and language courses functioning as instruments to restrict immigration and select migrants. All actors who have introduced integration requirements abroad should consider that this is not in line with EU law (as evidence from numerous court cases demonstrates). The Conclusions of the latest Council and Representative of Governments and the Member States on integration of TCN (June 2014) stress the need for "voluntary cooperation between receiving countries and countries of origin in a pre-departures phase" which would facilitate reception and integration in destination countries. Besides, the reference to "voluntary cooperation" clearly underlines that the introduced integration

requirement, adopted by some MS, that could impede family reunification is not in line with EU law.

- The EU Commission should issue clear implementation guidelines of EU directives concerning the integration requirements that TCNs must fulfill (long-term residence and family reunification directives) envisaging the use of infringement procedures.

CBP 7 – stating that *frequent interaction between immigrants and Members State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration* – should be implemented. However, such implementation should avoid banal sociability during accidental encounters or the risk of *schismogenesis*, namely the creation of divisions fostering negative feedback or vicious cycle relations. For example, if boasting is the typical way in which a group deals with another, and if the other group replies to boasting with more boasting, then each group will drive the other into more extreme rivalry, and ultimately to hostility. Evidence from Sociology of street mobility studies shows that places with high concentration of diversity are more places of transit rather than places of mixing. Places are often racialized, creating the conditions for inequalities rather than for an egalitarian mixing of people.

- Frequent interaction turns into social cohesion when the process is carefully supervised and mediated, in particular at local level.
- The local level should promote the creation of new tools for diversity work to stimulate meaningful contacts.
- Effective and innovative projects, not based directly on integration, but on wider issues or local problems should be promoted by local or national institutions.

Policies creating opportunities and incentives for **volunteering** could play a crucial role in promoting both trust and tolerance (J. Laurence, 2001).

Hessen government promotes training and deployment of integration volunteers usually with a migrant background. In a broad spectrum of

public relation activities voluntary work implies cooperation between parties involved, and open-minded attitudes on all sides (W. Kindermann and I. Wilkens, 2014).

Another case is developing effective structures which allow migrants to in-put their views on common community activities such as festivals and events, encouraging wide ranging participation as was the case with the Peoples of the World Festival in Bilbao (URBACT II, 2010:13).

As in CBP 7, shared forum, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrants' cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments are supposed to enhance the good interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.

Experiences of shared forums promoting **intercultural dialogue** have had different outcomes. Concerning the inter-religious dialogue, evidence shows it is better to engage with religious groups in new ways. Research found not singling out one group (usually Muslims) for a particular program, but creating an inter-faith network helped overcome the limited capacities of small organizations. For example, the Council of Faiths organization in the UK and the Faith Leaders Forum in Leicester, which represent all faiths, or the Islam Forum set up in Berlin which brings together key stakeholders to discuss topics in a safe and private environment.

- Since processes of perception and attitude formation are complex and operate through many levels, any campaign to influence perceptions, attitudes and ideas should also be multi-levelled, be tailored to concrete contexts, and be longer in duration, involving different actors in civil society.
- High levels of participation are a fundamental requirement for the success of forums and networks.
- Effective forums and networks must be well resourced because, if not managed correctly, they can increase the workload for participants and coordinating organizations.

For the opening of a new Mosque in Duisburg, the Mosque advisory board contained a large range of different people, including a Catholic priest. The outcome of the consultations meant that there has been no tension surrounding the opening of the new Mosque. This can be compared to the planning of a new Mosque in Cologne which provoked considerable conflict.

Given the worsening image of Islam in the public sphere of European societies, States need to find adequate partners for consultation, recognition and pacification. Muslim communities are frequently asked to form representative bodies by many public authorities. Nonetheless, the lack of representativeness in migrant communities remains evident almost everywhere around Europe. Migrants encounter difficulties in following prescribed paths to be an officially recognized organization, and suffer social network weakness and scarce visibility in the public arena. In particular, Muslim associations founded in the last decades cannot compare with churches with respect to tradition, public influence, established networks, broad membership and organization (D. Thranhardt, 2014).

- Policies should take into account the historical process of adaptation for migrants, which quite often varies over time. Investment should be channeled into building excellent community and civil society leaders, who should come from a wide range of backgrounds and be a mixture of men and, importantly, women, nationalities, *statuses*, and ages.

Education about migrants and migrant cultures among European societies is a goal that is far from being achieved. Against the widespread non-migrant feelings and ideologies, often expanded and exploited by media and politicians, a more balanced and constructive vision on migration, in which facts are not mystified by myths, is needed.

- The immigration debate should be more rational, highlighting the role that migrants play in economies and society and accepting the inevitability of diversifying populations in a globalized world.

- The normalization of diversity has to be supported and enhanced by every level of governance.

The latest European Social Survey (2013) shows that citizens of EU countries perceive immigration as more of a cultural problem than as an economic one. The public opinions' attitude is crucial in accepting or rejecting different types of policies.

- European countries should focus more on long-term systematic measures that address the native population's cultural understanding of migration, such as educational and non-discrimination policies.
- Long-term systematic measures should foster the mutual understanding within the entire population.
- Educating natives about diversity is a key element in the integration process. Efforts should be concentrated on this field, instead of focusing only on launching large-scale campaigns to understand the "different" and the encouragement of frequent interactions between natives and migrants.
- Education about the reality of multiculturalism and mobility as a global phenomenon with local impacts should also be enhanced.
- Teachers should be equipped with skills for managing diversity.

Copenhagen is working hard to provide more concrete evidence of the diversity advantage. Through its Innoversity programme it recruited 30 companies and showed that diverse cleaning teams in ISS Facility Services generated 3.7 percent more earnings than homogenous teams. ISS has more than 11,000 employees in Denmark and, therefore they calculated that if every cleaning team in Denmark were as diverse, it could mean a growth in revenue of DK 100 million per annum. The Danish government has published an official report proving that diversity within an organization enhances innovative capacity by up to 30 percent (Intercultural Cities, 2013, 9).

Ameliorating living conditions in urban environments is a hard task, because polarities are concentrated and exacerbated in cities. However, many European cities set themselves the ambitious goal of minimizing these negative effects (CLIP, Cities of Migration, Intercultural Cities and Eurocities).

We Amsterdammers, 100%Luxembourg, Yours Istanbul, Belonging to Dewsbury, Hamburg. My Port. Germany. My Home, are just some of the high profile campaigns aimed at creating a collective local identity, supporting diversity and tackling racism, through a celebration of their multi-ethnic image.

Planning for a particular project which aims to stimulate living conditions in urban environments should take into account the participation of the majority community, i.e. the native population residing in that area. Yet, in places with increasing numbers of small migrant groups there could be problems with participatory planning in achieving representativeness. In the participatory planning initiative for the Station Area in Reggio Emilia, the vast majority of citizens who got involved turned out to be natives, in an area where the majority of residents are of foreign origin (A. Pogliano, 2012: 8). However, if participatory planning is given the proper amount of time in order to start functioning, it can become a success, as the case of Berlin demonstrates. The Quartiermanagement (QM) programme was set up by the Senate in 1999 in 15 neighborhoods, most of which having a significant migrant population. A dedicated 'resident fund', a form of participative budgeting, led to previously unseen levels of local citizen involvement. With a particular focus on people with a migrant background, this participative policy enabled the city to have a better understanding of the needs and priorities of migrant communities. By involving migrant residents' decisions to shape the use of 'resident funds', the feeling of shared ownership of local policies increased (DIVE, 2013).

CBP 8 - states that: *The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights on with national law* and as such, invokes the **intercultural model**, in which the respect of any possible cultural value or practice is

combined with the respect for Fundamental Rights.

Following the intercultural principle, in response to every cultural or religious claim, the final solution should contemplate a fair mix of human dignity, right to life and to the integrity of the person, and the right to cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.

Female Genital Mutilation/Modification is an example of how the respect for the Fundamental Right to the integrity of the person can collide with traditional rites. In this controversial case, it has been proven that broad campaigns on gender health combined with programs seeking to empower women have better results in eradicating these practices than denigrating or denouncing battles.

The interconnections between dimensions

Recognising the interconnections among the three dimensions is crucial in order to implement effective strategies that are able to support integration. These three dimensions are different in as much as their direct objectives are concerned, but they are interconnected and should always be considered as such.

In fact, on one hand evidence sheds light on the negative, even if sometimes inadvertent, impacts of one dimension on the others, due to wrong policies or attitudes. On the other hand, there are examples of good policies in promoting efficient migration and integration practices that can positively impact on more than one dimension at a time.

As has been highlighted above, the socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political one, particularly if access to rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied by the State's legislation. Potentially, the outcomes of migrant integration in the socio-economic dimension may also be influenced by the ethnic/cultural/religious one. For example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of migrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society this leads to fewer opportunities and lower scores for migrants in the so-called hard domains

of employment, education, housing and health care, even if access is legally guaranteed.

*Evidence from Denmark shows that as **migrants' income** has improved, they are able to move to better housing areas with better schools. This could happen more or less immediately, but it rarely does so because of existing barriers in the housing and/or education systems and/or in other dimensions.*

*As stated by the CLIP final report on **housing**, ethnic discrimination, as well as discrimination against migrants in the housing market, is a widespread phenomenon.*

The educational domain offers one clear example of linkage between dimensions. Indeed, the right to access school (**schools** should institutionally be obliged to accept migrants or migrants' children), can be hampered by some schools that find ways to avoid accepting migrant pupils (for example, by setting prohibitive fees or by not offering special facilities for migrant children, like remedial teaching or religious instruction).

Furthermore, growing immigration control and tough immigration discourses also have an impact on undocumented children's access to education.

Parents' fear of being detected if sending their children to schools is regularly revealed in many interviews with undocumented migrants.

In France in 2006 the-then Minister of Interior Sarkozy sent police to schools to detect undocumented migrants who then went to fetch their children from school.

In Germany the obligation of public officials to denounce undocumented migrants in practice often prevented undocumented children's access to education.

The same practice has also been criticized in the United Kingdom.

The political and legal dimension also plays a role regarding **access to health care services**. Indeed, the high degree of autonomy held by health care institutions has tended to result in big disparities from municipality to municipality, in some cases.

In Brussels alone, there are nineteen municipalities with different requirements and procedures. While some are rather restrictive and ask for cumbersome procedures, others are more open and even proactive when providing services for undocumented migrants. For instance, the social welfare centers in Brussels Capital and Molenbeek municipalities provide a “medical card” to secure undocumented migrants' treatment or receipt of medicine for certain period, thus saving them from passing through the entire procedure each time.

The municipality of Munich decided in 2006 to set up a medical contact point for “uninsured people”. Similarly, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt offer anonymous consultation hours to facilitate undocumented migrants' use of their services.

In contrast with other Dutch cities, Rotterdam facilitates the vaccination of children whose parents are not registered in the County Clerk's office by accepting them on referral by midwives, general practitioners or schools, and by providing these vaccinations free of charge.

In 2012 the Spanish government's decision to exclude undocumented migrants from full access to health care was opposed by several autonomous communities (e.g. Basque Country and Catalonia) and implemented differently at different regional and local levels.

The **citizenship acquisition** issue illustrates another linkage between the three dimensions. Several EU member States have made citizenship harder to obtain. Under the pretext of integration, language and civic integration courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective. Indeed, a general shift to more demanding integration conditions has taken place across Europe, resulting in the exclusion of large numbers of migrants from obtaining citizenship; this is particularly the case in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. Some aspects of integration tests may thus lead to social exclusion rather than to enhance integration. Therefore, acquisition of citizenship, rather than being seen as an instrument that would facilitate integration, as in the case of Sweden and The Netherlands, is now increasingly redefined as the pinnacle of a process of cultural adaptation. Cities can, however, play a much more involved role by promoting different kinds of actions aimed

at fostering access to citizenship such as language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship tests or examinations.

The naturalization campaigns carried out in some German cities, such as Berlin or Hesse are cases in point.

A more developed project has been promoted by the municipality of Hamburg, where volunteer facilitators from various different communities have been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who are hesitant or need guidance because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge of the benefits of naturalization.

The interconnection of the three strategies is also visible in the **inter-faith forum** experiences.

The Migrants Rights Network, the Conseil Roubaisien de l'Interculturalité et de la Citoyenneté, and COSIM in Dunkirk (successfully replicated in Santander) are examples of successful practice, where forums and networks can help small organizations to overcome the difficulties posed by limited capacity.

The success of this approach depends on having the right political environment within which to operate so that institutions are open to the information they receive and are prepared to act. If this is not the case, migrant participants will quickly lose faith in the forum, seeing it as a “talking shop” without any practical purpose, and withdraw their participation.

These different experiences demonstrate that the practice of diverse cultures and religions, within generally accepted EU norms, should be guaranteed, applying the principle of equity in treatment, and putting special emphasis on the implementation mode of decisions.

Strategies for integration

Given the complexity of the phenomenon and the number of spheres of actions involved at several levels, it is crucial to focus on some shared strategies that can be implemented in different contexts. These strategies have been identified by considering the evidence collected through the

desk research phase of the KING project and the analysis of the CBPs. Indeed, evidence has shed light on a common denominator linked to each path of integration: discriminatory behavior. As a matter of fact, discrimination is the main enemy of integration processes. Therefore, non-discrimination measures are fundamental to increase social cohesion and obtain a more integrated society. The other two strategies, mainstreaming and monitoring, concern policies implementation. Mainstreaming refers to the way targets and/or needs should be addressed, while monitoring is a fundamental tool to focus on the characteristics of the targets and of their needs.

Mainstreaming

CBP 10 reads - *Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.*

Voices claiming that integration is a multi-faceted phenomenon are not rare in academia. If scholars insist on the complexity of the phenomenon, policy-makers often opt for a simpler response by conferring the task of integration to a specific Ministry, DG, agency, and so forth. While the latter is clearly identifiable by constituencies and conveys the message that the issue is taken care of, the designation of a specific body in charge of this task may fail to address the issue in its complexity.

Mainstreaming as a strategy implies that different competences sit at the same table to tackle a topic that concerns education, gender equality, housing, healthcare, but also justice, economy or finance. The framing of the issue should be changed, so that policy formulation encompasses the different dimensions of integration. Climbing down the scale, a corresponding approach should be endorsed by implementers so that the policy formulated at higher levels is properly implemented

Mainstreaming should thus place emphasis on transforming structures and processes by questioning the *status quo* in order to comprehend integration in its complexity.

- At all stages of the policy cycle (definition of the problem, formulation of the response, implementation, assessment, and termination or reformulation), institutional structures, policy instruments and priorities should be questioned to ensure integration is being mainstreamed.
- Mainstreaming is however not free from drawbacks. There is a high risk that integration disappears under the guise of mainstreaming. Therefore, specific attention must be paid, so as to ensure that integration does not disappear as a policy concern, but is duly and correctly mainstreamed.

Mainstreaming has a horizontal and also a vertical dimension. Since policy takes place in a multilevel governance context, relevant levels should be involved in accordance with their competence. European institutions, when dealing with integration and immigration (where its competence is wider, as migration policies highly impact integration capacities), should work hand in hand. All DGs of the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council should work together.

- Mainstreaming is a vertical and horizontal strategy: different levels of policy-making should collaborate (within their remits); at each of these levels, specific sections (employment, education, health...) must collaborate to accomplish the desired outcome.
- Where no explicit competence has been conferred upon the EU, the EU should play its role as an arena of coordination where Member States agree on common goals and priorities. This role of facilitator is fundamental to foster a common view of a similar issue, to ensure exchange of ideas and experiences, and to avoid the negative aspects of command and control policy instruments. However, some level of constraint may be needed to ensure true commitment on the part of Member States.

- Soft law presents the advantage of avoiding “adversarial legalism” but falls short of harmonizing national legislations. The introduction of a “shadow of hierarchy” in the absence of an agreement, offers the concrete possibility that more constraining rules can be adopted, or at least raise the issue that more constraining rules are desirable in some policy areas.

More cooperative forms of policy-making have been explored by academia and the EU Commission. Gathering policy-makers of different levels in the same arena may be of great benefit in order to define common objectives. This would also enable different levels to determine their own strategies to reach these common goals. Therefore, each level, within broadly defined areas, would foster innovation and experimentation in delivering public policies.

- The EU Commission should act as an ‘entrepreneur of ideas’ encouraging the creation of different coalitions for different problems, selecting interlocutors on a case-by-case basis, and steering their dialogue, in order to build strategic winning coalitions;
- In areas not covered by EU secondary law, Member States should cooperate with the EU and local levels within a common framework, jointly defining main goals, and agreeing on procedures and indicators for the evaluation of the attainment of those goals.

Different policy dimensions should be more interconnected, responding to the interdependence experienced in practice. Evidence shows that if skills and labour shortages were properly matched, migrants would have more possibilities to immediately access the labour market and thus would be able to start their socio-economic integration. This may seem banal, but it should be accompanied by coordinated and efficient policies based on more collaboration between EU Commission DGs (e.g. coordination between DG Home Affairs and DG Employment to set up a shared migratory policy

that includes recruitment and entry of migrants in the labour market).

- More Directorate-Generals (DGs) should be involved in the design of integration policies, with one DG acting as Coordinator.

This solution would help overcome the “securitisation frame” that has characterized the EU approach to migration and integration so far and that has been undertaken mainly by the national Ministers of Interiors.

- EU Migration policies should not be only dealt with by the Council of Ministers composed by Ministers of Interior of Member States in order to avoid the “security bias” entrenched in the EU approach to migration and to reinforce the focus on integration. The Ministries of Health, Education, Employment or else of Foreign Affairs should be involved.
- Furthermore, exchanges and more cooperation between regional and national levels are required to better deal with the diverse dimensions of the integration process.

One interesting example of a joint strategy is the Hessen (DE) National Integration Plan. Since 2006, following the Nationaler Integrationsplan (National Integration plan), proposed by Hessen to the Federal Government, all those dealing with integration in politics and society worked in close partnership. This included: Federal Government, the States, cities and municipalities, migrants, institutions and organizations from science, media, culture, sports, trade and industry, trade unions and religious groups (Federal Government 2007). Part of the implementation of the plan was the annual Integrationsministerkonferenz (Integration Ministers`Conference). This exchange and close cooperation has had positive effects on Hessian integration policies.

- Close cooperation between different levels of policy-making should facilitate the transfer of relevant elements of successful experiences.

- Support national and regional Government in developing strategies for integration that will form the basis of local, regional and national policy.

The local level is essential for creating the conditions for sustainable integration. But this level needs to be supported by regional and national factors. National levels cannot withdraw from their role of resourcing and standard-setting to ensure that local initiatives are well-resourced, properly managed, and effective. Without this central monitoring role, local projects can disappear, or be poorly managed or resourced.

The **complexity** of the network responsible for implementing policy (i.e. the **involvement of all possible levels of governance**) is an important factor for fostering integration.

*The Modellregionen Program implemented in Hessen provided that in cities and municipalities, active participants developed a **grassroots movement** on integration and found encouragement through a fully accountable leadership. From 2014, all Hessian counties will benefit from these experiences. Through a new programme called WIR ("we"), the State of Hessen aims to further facilitate intercultural awareness. The 33 cities and municipalities in Hessen can employ full-time coordinators to implement strategies. Furthermore, the programme will emphasize the establishment of a welcoming and open culture; intercultural awareness and acceptance in administrations, associations, and organisations; active integration partnerships in the regions; reliable and accessible language assistance; training and implementation of integration volunteers and innovative projects. **Platforms** for sharing local experiences of current issues will showcase good ideas and promote successful integration policies. The Ministry of Integration sets the framework for tasks but leaves responsibility for implementation to other ministries, in order to focus solely on cross-cutting issues.*

- The supranational and the local levels should gain more prominence: the former in order to uphold the civil rights of migrants in the light of EU core values, the latter since it is closer to end users and can be better tailored to their specific needs, as the assessment of best

policies at local level in key social integration domains shows.

A second frame of mainstreaming concerning migrants' integration is the universalistic approach. This proscribes that social policies are addressed to all residents, including third country nationals. This is in line with the reference to *Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in [...] public services*.

A super diverse society requires strategies to overcome the traditional approach of addressing migrants through specific measures.

The will to consider the entire population makes it necessary to focus on identified needs, rather than on separate groups that are rarely correctly defined. Therefore, if wide and shared policies are put in place that address the entire population, they should be characterized by flexible strategies in order to guarantee tailored services that can respond to specific needs of the whole population regardless of their origin. Examples of this kind of strategy already exist and they are better known as "indirect integration policies". However they often remain vague and incomplete as they scarcely succeed in providing flexible and suitable solutions for all services.

- Appropriate responses depend on the political climate but the most effective and innovative projects may not be based specifically around integration but on a wider issue or local problem that has brought people together.

Indeed, adopting a mainstreamed approach to realize integration policies requires a parallel path involving both the form of governance and the strategies adopted. It is a hazardous process since mainstreaming hides several unintended consequences. Among them, the most dangerous is the "shadow effect": migrants risk disappearing when reference is given to the entire population. Therefore, a supplementary effort should be made to monitor population changes and needs. At the same time, considering the entire population can help implement policies that are able to respond correctly to identified needs and support equal access to provisions to obtain equal outcomes.

Monitoring

CBP 11 reads: *Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.*

For policies to be effective, they should be monitored throughout their implementation, from problem definition to policy termination or reformulation. The development of clear goals is an essential step of policy formulation. It serves several purposes: it provides implementers with an objective to be pursued, irrespective of the level at which they take action; they guarantee coherent implementation within a territory, thus ensuring that end-users end up with comparable conditions; and they enable a regular assessment of the state of play, of the advancement in the direction defined beforehand; i.e. are we getting closer or should the policy be redefined? This also requires clear definition of goals so that a policy may be counterfactually evaluated (either through experimental or quasi-experimental methods). To be functional, goals must be operationalized through indicators that can be monitored throughout the policy cycle. Baseline data is of primary importance in order to successfully evaluate the policy or programme.

Monitoring fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel governance and the mainstreaming of integration. On one hand, monitoring allows policy makers to understand integration processes and their variety according to different profiles (gender, age, education, immigration status, country of origin, skills, etc.). It makes it possible to map migrants' needs, so that appropriate political responses can be brought about. On the other hand, monitoring allows policy makers to watch over changes in the target groups' situation and to adjust policies accordingly. However, this also requires that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises of a set of stable indicators. The finer geographical level also seems to be the best place to monitor the implementation of integration policies. Consequently it also represents the best level for identifying accountability mechanisms.

In 2010, the Hessian Monitoring Report on Integration (Integrationsmonitoring) was

published for the first time. A second edition was released in 2013, showing integration trends since 2005. The Hessen Government publishes studies on integration topics which go more into detail, e.g. on school education of migrant students, early childhood education, labor market participation of foreigners, migrant organizations or religious beliefs in Hessen. If possible, the Ministry conducts public opinion polls. Thus, the Hessen population was surveyed on immigration twice. To serve local actors, a study on the state of integration policies in cities and municipalities had been conducted wherein most municipalities had been involved (W. Kindermann and I. Wilkens, KING 2014).

- Individual data should be collected on gender, age, education, country of origin, skills, immigration status, etc. so that target groups are properly identified and their issues addressed.
- Monitoring should be embedded in a wider policy context. This would increase politicians' liability, especially if monitoring is used to conduct ex-post policy evaluations and ex-ante impact assessments.
- Monitoring bodies' activity should be funded by States, as this would ensure the appropriate timings for data gathering and analysis, provided that the independence of the monitoring body from government is guaranteed.

If monitoring is to be a tool better serving integration policies, the definition of the target population is of the utmost importance. Where integration is monitored, approaches vary a great deal. Whilst some policies consider nationals and non-nationals as the defining criterion (for instance: Czech Republic, Ireland or Italy), some others encompass people with a migrant background (for instance: Austria, Germany or Belgium).

Even though the definition of migrant background may vary in different instances, it ensures that the issues of second or third generations can be traceable. In the event that the target group concentrates on non-nationals, or else non-EU nationals, second and third generation migrants are *de facto* excluded from the scope of the monitoring. This is likely to undermine the

objectives pursued by monitoring; i.e. mapping needs to shape better responses. This may be temporarily justified in recent destination countries but it will inevitably become a limitation of monitoring processes as migrants become more settled. Furthermore, recording only “non-EU citizens” hides the difficulties experienced by migrants coming from countries that only recently have acceded to the EU.

The number and nature of indicators are also different in EU member states. Such differences mirror different national realities and are therefore sensible. However, the adoption of some common indicators, within member States’ sets of indicators would allow comparison and facilitate exchange between member States and the different levels of governance, from the EU to the local level.

As much as the situation differs from one Member State to another, the situation also differs within Member States.

- Regional and local monitoring may uncover particular issues linked to a specific local setting and provide a more precise “snapshot” of the situation.
- The quantity, quality and the periodicity of data gathering should be improved. Member States that have not yet seriously committed to monitoring should do so.
- Comparability of national data should be enhanced by opting for some common indicators and a common definition, including the definition of ‘people with migration background’. National monitoring bodies should consider the EU Core indicators as a yardstick.

In order to maximize the positive effects of a policy and reduce its negative ones, more impact evaluation should be conducted. Impact evaluation may be more or less costly. The most effective and more costly impact evaluation consists in experimental counterfactual methods. Evaluation should start as the policy is being implemented. This is a prospective approach intended to test and learn on the ground. Other, less reliable and less costly impact evaluations are retrospective and quasi-experimental. They rely

on sound data collection (e.g. monitoring). Evaluations often occur at the end of a project and consist in an evaluation of its compliance with their initial goals. In so doing, they assess the input much more than the outcome, the latter being the objective announced.

- Impact evaluation and pilot projects may be conducted to better identify what works and what is worth being extended.

When impact evaluation is unavailable, evaluation should take place to verify goals are being attained and to foster learning processes.

The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission has been identified as unique as it requires its funded projects to test new ideas, or to develop innovative methods and come up with solutions to social issues. It recognizes that innovation may be accompanied by failure but considers this as part of a learning process.

However, evaluations often happen at the end of projects rather than being formative i.e. undertaken throughout the life of a project, and thereby helping to shape project development through a process of feedback.

- Evaluation of integration initiatives should be formative so that these initiatives can be improved as they develop.
- A systematic and centralized method (including a website) for sharing the outcomes of the evaluations of projects across the EU should be created, in order to disseminate good practice.

CBP 11 stresses the importance of - *making the exchange of information more effective*. There is a general lack of appropriate data or analysis that leaves serious data gaps regarding a range of possible measures such as use of services, attitudes of nationals, and the impact of service use on inclusion. In the past there has been much duplication of effort as a result of the failure to disseminate good practice or knowledge about how to overcome challenges and problems.

One of the main neglected issues concerns the lack of analysis that is able to clearly illustrate the effectiveness of the measure/practice in the given

context. In other words, methods should be elaborated to better evaluate integration measures in the light of population targets (do they correctly address correctly the right target?) and of the contextual situation (does the context, socio – legal – economic, support the realization of the practice?).

The project European Modules and Integration at Local Level aimed at comparing integration practices throughout Europe, not only considered their goals and contents but also compared their respective implementation contexts. This illustrated that context does matter, and integration practices or policies cannot be compared without taking due heed of their environment. In doing so, this constitutes the first step towards the transfer of relevant elements of a practice or a policy in other contexts (D. Carrillo, M. D’Odorico, G. Gilardoni, 2013).

Such an analysis could be more effective in explaining project outcomes, either in terms of good or bad results. It would provide understanding of the measure/practice itself and also identify which of its components could be transferred, how and where.

- Even if a one-size-fits-all policy is not desirable, it is important to identify the key lessons learnt from successful policies across Europe.
- In particular, actor-centered policies (putting end-users, that is, migrants at the center of the policy design) should be taken as sources of inspiration.

One example of analysis of the practice in order to share knowledge comes from LeCim project.

The LeCim project developed evaluation grids with a specific set of local indicators to consider the possibility of a successful transfer of integration practice. The results concluded successful transfer did not necessarily rely on close comparability of two places (in terms of economy, social situation, education and training policies, organizational or informal structures) but more on matching the concept (and basic values) of the programme and on the willingness to adapt new models by those responsible in the target institutions to their own context.

Starting from practices that tend to be regarded as good practices, it is advisable to look at their degree of innovativeness; for example, to look at the extent to which migrants are placed at the center of the policy/practice design. Since the range of involved actors varies from one place to another, there is no straightforward manner to transfer policies/practices: each form of policy transfer has to be specific to the two contexts involved.

Eventually, a repertoire of worst policies/practices and of policy failures could be constructed, in order to apply a trial and error method.

- ‘Worst practices’ and policy failures should also be studied, in order to avoid repeating mistakes.

While much research has explored different aspects on integration, as yet no well-defined mechanism has been developed that can examine integration processes in their entirety. Such methods would need to be longitudinal in order to take into account the lengthy period of time integration can take. Indeed as yet indicators of integration, though developed, are not widely used and access to employment and income equity continues to be the main measurements of integration. Insights in other dimensions of integration would be desirable. For instance, how do migrants feel in their receiving society? What is their social standing? What language do they speak at home? Do they maintain contacts with the locals? Do they identify with European ideas and cultures?

More attention needs to be paid to how social, economic and cultural domains of integration connect.

Non-discrimination

In its ‘Conclusions on integration of third country nationals legally residing in the EU’, adopted in June 2014, the JHA Council of the European Union and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States agreed on the need to further non-discrimination policies (9905/14). An enhancement of non-discrimination measures, specifically concerning discrimination in the workplace is called for, through close cooperation with social partners and civil society.

Non-discrimination is the strategy aimed at fighting direct and explicit as well as unintended or indirect discrimination and racism at institutional, collective and individual level. Almost every CBPs refers in some way to discrimination, given its role in preventing integration, and also undermining social cohesion. In particular, CBP 2 - stating that *Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union* - implicitly refers to non-discrimination, which is one of the European basic values (The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 22).

Within virtually every EU Member State, there appears to be a growing and almost inexorable tendency towards racism and discrimination at institutional (policy) and individual levels. This is manifest in increasing numbers of incidents of racist violence and abuse and by growing disregard by institutions to the differing cultural and religious needs of migrants and minorities more generally. This tendency undermines the process of integration.

Discrimination is firstly recognized at the institutional level where the law defines who is entitled to enjoy rights and who is not. Indeed, institutional social exclusion is, through legislation, regulations and conventions the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination.

In the political and legal sense, such distinctions cannot be called discriminatory (i.e. legally unjustified), since they are embedded in the nation state's legislation. However, this is social exclusion, and it has severe consequences for the position of migrants, particularly in the long term.

The alleviation of this legalized political exclusion should be at the core of European integration policies, through provisions like partial voting rights in local elections, diminished distinctions between inhabitants based on national citizenship, and the facilitation and promotion of naturalization.

Evidence shows that when certain openness occurs, significant results are achieved without an explicit policy addressing them.

- Institutional social exclusion should be diminished by facilitating access to rights.

Secondly, discrimination is present at a collective level in many different vicious forms. In this domain, there are norms aimed at fighting against discrimination and institutions are more attentive and active. As mentioned in the analysis of the socio-economic dimension, discrimination prevents access to education and work opportunities.

Thirdly, discrimination at the individual level is a serious obstacle to social trust and well-being. Acts of racism and harassment targeting migrants and people belonging to minorities demonstrably reduce social confidence, affecting the whole process of integration.

When discrimination occurs at individual levels, laws and norms, if properly applied, can act in defense of those who are discriminated. The lack of visibility of individual discrimination is one of the most crucial aspects.

Discrimination is a powerful device generally used to regulate the distribution of resources and opportunities and to limit the erosion of the personal satisfaction related to the consumption of goods and services. It exists in facts and discourses, operating both at concrete and symbolic levels.

With regard to the effects of discrimination at a concrete level, evidence clearly shows fewer opportunities and lower outcomes for migrants in domains such as housing, education and health, even if access is legally guaranteed. The complex interplay of local factors can be the reason for discrimination within labor market mechanisms in particular, but also in relation to housing, health and education provision.

The main evidence is found in the labor market, where the complementarity of the migrant labor force results almost everywhere as subaltern to native workers. Non-discrimination policy has to compete with much more powerful labor market forces, in which discrimination is used to assure natives a differentiated structure of opportunity.

- Non-discrimination strategies have to be directly applied to discrimination devices correcting patterns of inequalities.
- An effective European integration approach needs to be complemented by Europe-wide policies for fighting against racism and discrimination, thereby focusing upon respect for EU basic equality values.
- At the EU level, social exclusion policy for migrants should focus heavily on the nature and workings of existing immigration legislation in individual countries which regulate residence rights, naturalisation, access to social and industrial rights and facilities, and representation and influence in politics. Adequate equality policies are a prerequisite for a non-discrimination policy.
- Policies should emphasise inclusion for all, aiming at creating more spaces for people to access equal opportunities within the established legal framework.

Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits. This discourse undermines the attitude of social solidarity towards welfare provision which led originally to the establishment of welfare systems.

There is a growing tendency to blame migrants for a range of social and economic ills. Minorities are also blamed for poor levels of achievement and social integration. These narratives have often exacerbated tensions as they are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstream political parties. As both groups – migrants and receiving societies – should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should be made to provide education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to minorities, teaching intercultural communication skills, myth-busting and embedding migrants in organizations to try and help them adapt to insider perspectives.

- Political parties and movements deserve special attention; nationalist-populist right-wing parties and movements with strong xenophobic and non-immigrant

positions have recently gained ground in many European countries and can feed a vicious circle of increasing obstacles to integration, rising cultural and ethnic tensions, and more demands for securitization policies.

The perverse effects of misperceptions and discriminatory attitudes strongly hamper both economic and social integration. There are cases where some aspects of an individual, related to cultural or religious identity, are easily stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organizations or institutions of) the receiving society. Discrimination and racism will hamper Europe's ability to compete on the global stage.

Discrimination should be overcome because it limits growth. Impeding fair competition within our societies, discrimination acts as a break to growth. Beyond being a fundamental value itself, non-discrimination supports the openness that is necessary to build better and stronger links between Europe and the rest of the world. -

- Discrimination, racism and exclusion are closely linked. Therefore an evidence-based analysis of reasons, and remedies, for exclusion should always be made available.
- Until the potentially disastrous phenomenon of racism is first acknowledged and then effectively addressed at European, national and community levels, much of the vast amount of energy put into the integration of migrants will be wasted.
- This should also be applied at the symbolic level with the proposal of new narratives of inclusiveness against widespread anti-migration attitude often fuelled by political parties and the media.
- There is a great need to focus initiatives on receiving communities as they strongly participate in the integration process but are too often neglected in intercultural measures.

- Mass media should be sensitized to the phenomenon of immigration in order not to project a negative perception of migrants and migrations. Member States may provide training and information on this key issue.

Conclusion

In the context of changing societies due to the growing presence of migrants, Europe has to face a choice between two available options. .

Europe may continue considering migration a more or less negative phenomenon and regard the changing nature of its constituent societies as a problematic cultural threat. It may favor the community of nationals to the detriment of migrants, discriminating against the latter through sophisticated institutional devices. The risks Europe runs in this case are high.

- Europe may go down the road of an ageing continent with fewer workers and therefore fewer tax payers or economic contributors, or, in a nutshell, fewer active citizens.
- Europe may fill some of its labor market gaps with low-skill workers, but it may consequently deprive itself of sources of innovation and human capital in an ever-more competitive world by opting for a suboptimal position.
- Relationships between natives and 'foreigners' does not improve and young migrants, skilled or otherwise, are deterred from remaining.
- For those migrants who do remain, the climate of distrust between the receiving society and 'foreigners' will steadily undermine future generations' trust in each other. Intended or unintended discrimination against 'foreigners' may disillusion first generations and subsequently generate negative perceptions amongst second and third generations towards the receiving society, fostering potentially social conflict.

Alternatively, Europe may change its current way of thinking and support a vision of societies made by both natives and migrants. Thus, not "us" and "them", but "we".

This kind of thinking could help to combat discrimination, to open access to its resources and facilitate migrants' own development and enable their full economic, social and political contribution to building societies across Europe. The challenge is considerable but the long-term benefits are immensurable.

- Europe would reverse its current demographic trend of decline, ensuring the sustainability of its economy and welfare state models.
- Europe would increase the likelihood that migrants can realize their full potential rather than being locked up by a framework of restrictions and limitations. It would attract skilled migrants, facilitating horizontal and vertical mobility and increasing its competitiveness.
- It would provide a climate of mutual understanding for newcomers that could integrate into a settled society and develop a true sense of belonging.
- European societies would then produce fully-fledged citizens, committed to the development of their societies.

Common Basic Principles have been the framework of integration policies' support for the last ten-year period. They continue to be a valuable tool to grasp the multiple relations that exist between integration and related policy fields. The relevance of the CBPs as the basis for future EU action and the importance of improving their implementation have been recently confirmed by the Council of Ministers in its Conclusions of 5-6 June 2014. Building on tenets enshrined in the CBPs, what is needed now is the elaboration of comprehensive policy responses that address the phenomenon of integration along all its main dimensions – legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious – and provide adequate support and steering to actors involved in the integration process at the local, national and supranational level.

Furthermore, it is desirable that the CBPs will be increasingly taken into account by the receiving society. They should cease to place the burden of integration solely with migrants.

Due to the complexity of the integration phenomenon and the number of policy levels it involves, it is here recommended to build future actions around three overarching strategies: mainstreaming, monitoring, and non-discrimination. A wide array of initiatives linked to those three strategies has already been undertaken by Member States at the national level and through the EU framework. Evidence here presented, however, has shown that there is a wide room for improvement, in particular by introducing better legislation, implementing existing ones, and increasing the coordination of national responses at the EU level.

The three above-mentioned strategies could hence be used as the building blocks of an EU roadmap for integration, something which is urgently needed because of the rapidly evolving nature of European societies and the increasing level of diversity they will have to cope with in the future.

Bibliography

- Bauböck R., Ersbøll E., Groenendijk K. & Waldrauch H. (eds.) (2006), *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European States. Vols. I and II*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam
- Bauböck R., Perchinig B. & Sievers W. (eds.), (2009) *Citizenship Policies in the New Europe*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam
- Bolderson H., (2011), *The ethics of welfare provision for migrants: a case for equal treatment and the repositioning of welfare*, Journal of Social Policy, 40(2): 219-236
- Caponio T., (2014), *The legal and political dimension of local integration*, KING Desk Research Paper n.11/2014, www.king.ismu.org
- Caponio, T. (2005), *Policy networks and immigrants associations in Italy. The cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples*, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (5): 931–950
- Carrillo, D., D’Odorico, M., Gilardoni, G. (2013), *EMILL, a tool for reading integrations practices and contexts*, Ismu Foundation, Milan
- Caselli M. (2010), Integration, participation, identity: immigrant associations in the province of Milan, International Migration, vol. 48, n. 2: 58-78
- Challenor F., Walters G. & Dunstan D. (eds.), (2005), *Need a hand? Report on the Review of Recent U.K. Volunteering Projects Relating to Asylum Seekers BVSC*, Undertaken for the Aspire DP: Birmingham
- Chopin, I. (2006), *Administrative practices in the acquisition of nationality*, in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk & H. Waldrauch (eds), *Acquisition and loss of nationality. Policies and trends in 15 European countries – vol. 1: Comparative analyses*, 221–268, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam.
- Cialdini R., (2010), *Le armi della persuasion. Come e perché si finisce col dire di sì*, Giunti Editore, Milano
- Cities of Migration & Maytree Foundation, (2012), *Good ideas from successful cities: Municipal leadership on immigrant integration*, The Maytree Foundation, <http://citiesofmigration.ca/publications/>
- Craig G., (2014), *Migration and Integration: a Local and Experiential Perspective*, KING Desk Research Paper n.12/2014, www.king.ismu.org
- Desiderio M.V. & Weiner A., (2014), *Supporting Immigrant integration in Europe? Developing the governance for diaspora engagement*, MPI Europe, May 2014
- DIVE (2013), *Cities Accommodating Diversity. Findings and recommendations from the peer review project* DIVE final report, Eurocities, Brussels
- Dwyer P., Lewis H., Hodgkinson S. and Waite L., (2012), *Status matters*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York
- European Modules on Integration, (2014), European Commission, Bruxelles,

http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_40802_750229173.pdf

Gilborn D. & Mirza, H., (2000), *Educational Inequality: Mapping Race, Class and Gender*, Institute of Education, London

Handoll, J., (2012), *Integration Policy in the European Union: The Question of Competence*, in Pascouau Y, Strik T. (eds.), *Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States*, Wolf Legal Publisher, Nijmegen

Helbling M., (2008), *Practising Citizenship and Heterogeneous Nationhood. Naturalisations in Swiss Municipalities*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam

Helbling M., (2010), *Naturalisation politics in Switzerland: explaining rejection rates at the local level*, in Caponio T. & Borkert M. (eds), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking*, Amsterdam, AUP, Imiscoe Report Series

InterCulturalCities, (2013), *The outcomes and impact of the intercultural cities programme 2008-2013*, Council of Europe - http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Cities/ICCOutcomes_en.pdf

Kerwin M. D., (2013), *Does respect for migrant rights contribute to economic development?* MPI, Policy brief n.1, September, 2013, www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration_development.php

Kindermann W. & Wilkens I., (2014), *Integration Policy in the State of Hessen, Germany. A Regional Case Study in a Federal System*, KING Desk Research Paper n.6/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Laurence J., (2011), *The effect of ethnic diversity and community disadvantage on social cohesion: A multi-level analysis of social capital and interethnic relations in uk communities*, European Sociological Review 27 (1): 70-89

Martinelli A., (2014) *The multilevel governance of immigrants' integration in the European Union. (Overviewpaper of the Political Science Group)*, KING Desk Research Paper WN/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Martiniello M. (2005), *Political participation, mobilisation and representation of immigrants and their offspring in Europe*, Malmoe, IMER working paper no. 1/05

Matusz Protasiewicz, P., (2014), *Local policies as cultural integration and social cohesion policies*, KING Desk Research Paper n.10/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Migge B. & Gilmartin M., (2011), *Migrants and health care: investigating patient mobility among migrants in Ireland*, Health and Place, 17: 1144-1149

Mussino E. & Strozza S., (2012), *The delayed school progress of the children of immigrants in lower-secondary education in Italy*, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(1): 41-57

Oers R. van, Hart B. de & Groenendijk C.A., (2006), *Netherlands*, In R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, C.A. Groenendijk & H. Waldrach (Eds.), *Acquisition and loss of nationality. Policies and trends in 15 European countries – vol. 2: Country Analyses* (pp. 391-434). Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam

Pasini N. & Coletti P., (2014), *Integration Policies in European Member States: how to Learn from Successful Experiences*, KING Desk Research Paper n.4/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Phillimore J., (2014), *Local and experiential aspects of migrant integration*, KING Desk Research Paper WN/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Phillimore, J., (2011), *Approaches to health provision in the age of super-diversity: accessing the NHS in Britain's most diverse city*, Critical Social Policy Volume 31 Issue 1

Phillimore J., Goodson L., Hennessy D. & Ergun E., (2009), *Empowering Birmingham's Migrant and Refugee Community Organisations: Making a Difference*, Joseph Rowntree Organisation, York

Pogliano, A., (2012), *AMICALL country report Italy*, FIERI, Turin

Poletti M. & Regalia M., (2014), *Economic or cultural threat? Orientations towards immigration and European integration among EU citizens and*

national parties over time, KING Desk Research Paper n.5/2014, www.king.ismu.org

Portes A., Vickstrom E., Haller W. & Aparicio R., (2013), *Dreaming in Spain: parental determinants of immigrant children's ambition*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(4): 557-589

Ramalingham V., (2013), *Integration: What Works? Research Report*, Institute of Strategic Dialogue, London

Schlueter E., Meuleman B., & Davidov E., (2013), *Immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat: a multilevel study of 27 Western and Eastern European Countries*, in *Social Science Research*, 42 (3): 670-682

Strik T., Böcker A., Luiten M. & van Oers R., (2010), *The INTEC Project: Synthesis Report. Integration and Naturalisation Tests: the New Way to European Citizenship*, Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen

Thranhardt D., (2014), *The State of European Integration Governance: A Comparative Evaluation*, KING Desk Research Paper n.7/2014, www.king.ismu.org

URBACT II (2010), *Integration and Inclusion Case Study Summaries URBACT II*, OpenCities 2010

Acknowledgments

The contents of the present Executive Summary result from the joint effort carried out by all researchers involved in the KING research project, and, in particular, from the close collaboration between the Steering Group and the Advisory Board, who collected and elaborated the results.

The definition of the research design, the collection of evidence and the formulation of recommendations have been carried out by Guia Gilardoni, Project Coordinator, Daniela Carrillo and Marina D’Odorico, Project Co-coordinators. The Steering Group composed by Veronica Riniolo, Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Giulia Mezzetti as well as the representatives of the partners of the Project - Ingrid Wilkens (State of Hessen), Patricia Frias (Cariplo Foundation), Altay Manço (IRFAM) gave a substantial contribute.

The definitions, terms, data, evidence presented and summarized in this Executive Summary have been drawn together thanks to the insights and the in-depth analysis provided by the research teams and the Advisory Board. We thank Rachel Humphris for his work in undertaking the final edit.

For their great work and their precious contributions, we are therefore grateful to:

- the Advisory Board members: Gian Carlo Blangiardo, Martin Kahanec, Walter Kindermann, Alberto Martinelli, Yves Pascouau, Rinus Penninx, Jenny Phillimore, Alessandra Venturini.
- the researchers involved in the project: D. Acosta, A. Bathily, S. Blom, T. Caponio, P. Coletti, G. Craig, M. Di Cesare, G. Fuhr Becker, B. Garcés-Mascreñas, F. Goettsche, M. Guzi, E. Heidbreder, R. Humphris, P. Keczmarczyk, K. Khan, M. Kindler, L. M. Kurekova, L. Levandovska, P. Matusz Protasiewicz, A. Menonna, L. Ortensi, N. Pasini, M. Poletti, V. Ratcheva, M. Regalia, H. Schwarz, M.R. Testa, D. Thranhardt.

Lastly, we are grateful to the European Commission – DG Home Affairs, the State of Hessen, IRFAM - Institut de Recherches, Formations et Actions sur les Migrations, the Cariplo Foundation and the Caixa Foundation for their confidence and financial support for this project.